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ABSTRACT
As computing becomes increasingly pervasive, dierent heteroge-
neous networks are connected and integrated. is is especially
true in the Internet of ings (IoT) and Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN) seings. However, as dierent networks managed by dier-
ent parties and with dierent security requirements are integrated,
security becomes a primary concern. WSN nodes, in particular,
are oen deployed “in the open”, where a potential aacker can
gain physical access to the device. As nodes can be deployed in
hostile or dicult scenarios, such as military baleelds or disaster
recovery seings, it is crucial to avoid escalation from successful
aacks on a single node to the whole network, and from there to
other connected networks. It is therefore crucial to secure the com-
munication within the WSN, and in particular, maintain context
information, such as the network topology and the location and
identity of base stations (which collect data gathered by the sensors)
private.
In this paper, we propose a protocol achieving anonymous rout-
ing between dierent interconnected IoT or WSN networks, based
on the Spatial Bloom Filter (SBF) data structure. e protocol en-
ables communications between the nodes through the use of anony-
mous identiers, thus hiding the location and identity of the nodes
within the network. e proposed routing strategy preserves con-
text privacy, and prevents adversaries from learning the network
structure and topology, as routing information is encrypted using
a homomorphic encryption scheme, and computed only in the en-
crypted domain. Preserving context privacy is crucial in preventing
adversaries from gaining valuable network information from a suc-
cessful aacks on a single node of the network, and reduces the
potential for aack escalation.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy →Network security; Embedded systems
security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Aacks against smart devices, sensor networks and the Internet
of ings (IoT) are increasing in both frequency and magnitude.
In particular, malware, intended as malicious soware or hard-
ware, poses a signicant security threat. As recently discovered by
Kryptowire, a company operating in the cybersecurity eld, more
than 700 million phones, cars and other smart devices running the
Android operating system were compromised and equipped with
malware capable of stealing every kind of information the device
was able to deal with (including les stored on the device or the
messages sent from the device to one another) [10]. e malware,
allegedly developed by Shanghai Adups Technology Company, sent
massive amounts of sensitive data about the devices and their users’
activities back to servers in China. is latest example proves that
commonly adopted business models in smart devices industry are
inadequate and potentially dangerous, as the devices are usually
not engineered following an eective security strategy. As such,
they are a preferred target for cybercrime groups, which can exploit
their ubiquity to build botnets or, in case they are deployed as part
of critical or sensitive infrastructure, to compromise the regular
workow of the network and infrastructure itself [17].
e emerging security threat, however, is not slowing the grow-
ing diusion of systems and services based on IoT and heteroge-
neous sensor networks, propelled by the relentless advances in the
production of low-cost embedded devices and sensors. As these
technologies are usually deployed in wireless environments, Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSN) have become a suitable solution for
an increasing number of applications, including health monitoring,
smart agriculture, weather sensing, intrusion detection applica-
tions and industrial control [7, 12]. In urban and suburban contexts,
these networks are oen connected one to each other, enabling
management control over complex scenarios. However, in spite of
the extensive research in the area, the Internet of ings and in
particular the interconnection of WSNs still face many security and
privacy challenges [11].
CF’17, May 15-17, 2017, Siena, Italy P. Palmieri et al.
e wireless nature of the communication link makes the net-
work inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping. Moreover, IoT and
WSN nodes are oen deployed in unsecured areas or outdoor, where
they can be subject to tampering, and a potential aacker might
be able to gain control of one or more nodes. For this reason, the
security of the network should be preserved even in the presence
of internal adversaries. In particular, both the communication be-
tween the nodes and the context information (including the location
of the nodes and the network organization) should be protected
[11].
In order to preserve the privacy of the communication, nodes
can employ encrypted communication protocols when feasible, due
to the low-power nature and limited computational capabilities of
most devices. With regard to context privacy, instead, the primary
aim is to hide the location and identity of the nodes in the network,
as well the overall the network structure and topology [3]. is is
crucial especially in WSNs, which are in general highly vulnerable
to aacks targeted at base stations (the nodes collecting the data
gathered by the sensors). In fact, failure of a base station can disrupt
network operation, making it an ideal target for an aacker. In
order to prevent adversaries from launching both remote, soware-
based aacks and physical aacks the location of base stations
and the network topology should be therefore concealed [4]. A
basic strategy to achieve this is ooding and transmissions of fake
or dummy packets, which make network trac observation more
dicult [19]. More complex strategies include the use of random
walks to route packets anonymously [9]. Random walks have been
adopted in a number of designs: Zhang proposed self-adjusting
directed random walks in [20], while GROW (Greedy Random Walk)
[18] introduced a two-way random walk, from both source and
destination, that can reduce the chance of an eavesdropper being
able to collect location information. Finally, layers of encryption
can be used to protect the information at each hop in the walk [5].
More recently, advanced anonymity techniques have been applied
to IoT and WSN, and in particular onion routing protocols derived
from Tor [14].
1.1 Contribution
In this paper we introduce a novel anonymous routing mechanism,
based on the Spatial Bloom Filter data structure and homomorphic
encryption. e proposed construction is targeted at preserving
context privacy within a network composed of a number of in-
terconnected subetworks. In particular, our construction can nd
direct application in all the seings where dierent networks, such
as wireless sensor networks or networks of smart or embedded
devices, are connected to form a larger network. e anonymous
routing mechanism achieves the following goals: encrypt communi-
cation between nodes; hide the identity and location of the sending
and receiving nodes in a communication between two dierent sub-
networks; hide the network structure and topology to all the nodes;
and hide the origin and destination of any communication between
subnetworks to the routing layer (that is, the network infrastructure
that connects the dierent subnetworks and is responsible for the
routing of packets between them). ese properties enable context
privacy and security against adversaries who control one or more
nodes within the network, and prevent aacks aimed at taking over
control of the network.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In the following we present the main building blocks of the pro-
posed routing mechanism: rst, the Spatial Bloom Filter (SBF)
[2, 15]. Second, the homomorphic encryption operations that make
it possible to compute the SBF in the encrypted domain. For the
laer, we base our construction on the Paillier cryptosystem [13],
although any equivalent alternative cipher may be used.
2.1 Spatial Bloom Filters
A Bloom Filter (BF) is a data structure that represents a set of ele-
ments in a space-ecient manner [1]. Bloom lters are widely used
in networking protocols, and have a variety of network security
applications [8]. Recently, Calderoni, et al. proposed a compact data
structure based on Bloom lters, designed to store location infor-
mation [2, 15]. e structure, called Spatial Bloom Filter (SBF), was
originally designed for location privacy applications. Two private
positioning protocols were proposed with the SBF, both aimed at
∆1 :
∆2 :
∆3 :
b# (SBF ) : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b# : 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
b# : 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1
b# : 1 3 1 0 2 0 1 3 2 3
Figure 1: Sets∆1, ∆2 and∆3 (representing three subnetworks)
are used to construct a SBF. ree hash functions are used
to map each element into the lter. In the rst step of this
example, the identiers of two nodes belonging to ∆1 are
processed by the hash functions, resulting in the value ’1’ be-
ingwritten six times into the SBF.e construction proceeds
likewise for elements of ∆2 and ∆3. Two kinds of collisions
are possible, as highlighted: the rst is intra set; the second
takes place when elements of sets marked with a greater la-
bel overwrite those with a lower value. e probability of
both events can be controlled to prevent false positives.
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keeping both the user’s exact position and the provider’s monitored
areas private. e SBF was recently evaluated in a comparative
assessment with other similar privacy-preserving techniques, show-
ing promising properties in several domains [16]. In particular, the
SBF is suitable for application beyond the location privacy eld. In
this paper, we use the SBF to build a novel private routing proto-
col for interconnected networks, a typical scenario in the IoT and
distributed sensor networks domain. In the following, we briey
review the data structure and its properties relevant to the proposed
construction; a full denition and discussion can be found in [2, 15].
A Spatial Bloom Filter extends the original Bloom Filter idea in
order to support several sets composed of elements belonging to
a specic domain E. A SBF can be used to perform membership
queries on the originating set of elements without knowledge of
the set itself but, contrary to the BF, a SBF can be constructed over
multiple sets. erying a Spatial Bloom Filter for an element returns
the identier of the specic set among all the originating sets in
which the element is contained, minus a false positive probability.
e SBFs hold several probabilistic properties useful to control the
false positive probability throughout the originating sets.
An SBF can be dened as follows: let E be a domain specic set
of elements (in this paper elements represent the IDs of network
nodes) and let S = {∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆s } be a set of subsets such that
∆i ⊆ E and S is a partition of the union set S¯ = ⋃∆i ∈S ∆i . LetO be
the strict total order over S for which ∆i < ∆j for i < j. We dene
the Spatial Bloom Filter over (S,O) as the set of pairs
B# (S,O) =
⋃
δ ∈S,h∈H
〈h(δ ), i〉
s. t. δ ∈ ∆i ∧ @δ∗ ∈ ∆j : h(δ∗) = h(δ ), i < j ,
(1)
where H = {h1, . . . ,hk } is a set of k hash functions such that each
hi ∈ H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, . . . ,m}, that is, the hash functions take
binary strings as input and output a number uniformly chosen in
{1, . . . ,m}.
A spatial Bloom lter B# (S,O) can be represented as a vector b#
composed ofm values, where the i-th value
b# [i] =
{
l if 〈i, l〉 ∈ B# (S,O)
0 if 〈i, l〉 < B# (S,O) . (2)
In the following, when referring to a SBF, we refer to its vector
representation b#.
e construction of an SBF starts by seing all values in b# to
0. en, starting from the rst set ∆1, each element belonging
to the set is processed by each function h ∈ H . Let us suppose
h (δ ) = i: in that case, the i-th value of b# will be set to 1 (as 1
is the label associated to ∆1). Elements belonging to subsequent
sets (∆2, . . . ,∆s ) are processed likewise. It is important to note
that collisions between two distinct values are subject to the SBF
collision rule: labels with higher value overwrite those with lesser
value. is procedure is exemplied in Figure 1.
In order to check whether or not an element δu is member of
the set ∆i ∈ S , two conditions need to be met:
∃h ∈ H : b# [h(δu )] = i and ∀h ∈ H ,b# [h(δu )] ≥ i . (3)
Substantially, one single b# [h(δu )] = 0 is sucient to state that
δu is not a member of S¯ . On the contrary, if b# [h(δu )] , 0 for
each hash function, then δu is a member of the set ∆i minus a false
positive probability; i is the lesser value among those returned by
the set of hash functions.
2.2 Homomorphic encryption
e Paillier cryptosystem [13] is an asymmetric encryption scheme
featuring notable homomorphic properties. Specically, in this pa-
per we rely on the additive homomorphism of the Paillier encryption
function over Zn , which leads to several identities, among which
we recall:
∀m ∈ Zn ,k ∈ N : D(E(m)k mod n2) = km mod n (4)
is multiplicative property ensures that an encrypted plaintext
raised to the power of a constant k will decrypt to the product of
the plaintext and k .
In the proposed protocol, we apply this multiplicative scheme on
a vector basis, achieving a secure entrywise product (also known
as Hadamard product). We refer to this operation as to Private
Hadamard Product, and we represent it with  .
We note here that the Paillier cryptosystem may not be suitable
for some heavily computationally constrained devices: however,
the proposed protocol can be achieved over any additively homo-
morphic cipher.
3 A SECURE ROUTING STRATEGY
We study a seing where dierent, heterogeneous subnetworks
are interconnected, creating a larger network. e subnetworks
are connected to each other by the routing layer, that is, the part of
the overarching network infrastructure that manages and routes
inter-network communication. Each subnetwork is composed of
multiple nodes, and can be connected to the routing layer either
directly, or through one or more gateways. In the case of Wireless
Sensor Networks, these gateways could also represent the base
∆1
∆2
∆3
Routinд layer
b# (SBF )
0
1
2
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
2
3
Figure 2: A sample sensor network composed of three sub-
networks ∆1, ∆2 and ∆3. Each subnetwork, composed by a
set of nodes, represents anArea of Interest (AOI) as described
in [2, 15], and is marked with a label. Anonymous routing
of packets between the subnetworks (done by the routing
layer) is achieved using an SBF representing the network.
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stations (where information from the sensor node is collected). e
aim of our construction is to enable private routing between the
subnetworks. In particular, we want to prevent an aacker that
controls one or more nodes of the network from being able to learn
the topology and structure of the network. Specically, he should
not be able to: determine the number of subnetworks, other than
those where he controls a node; the location of any node in the
network, that is, to which subnetwork a node belongs. We dene
the security of our construction as follows:
Security Denition. Private routing between dierent subnet-
works in a wider network is achieved when: any node in the net-
work only needs the ID’s of other nodes in order to communicate
with them, and learns nothing about their position within the net-
work; for each packet received, the routing layer learns only the
subnetwork to which the packet should be routed, and nothing
about the identity of the sending and receiving nodes. Any sub-
network gateway only routes packets transparently between the
subnetwork and the routing layer, and, similarly to other nodes
in the subnetwork, learns nothing about the positions of nodes
outside its subnetwork.
e security of the construction is analysed in Section 4.
3.1 Routing strategy
Each node of the network is identied by a unique, random ID.
Contrary to the IP address, the ID does not contain or imply any
information regarding the network structure. Within the network,
nodes communicate using their respective IDs, following a tunnel-
ing and encapsulation strategy for lower level protocols (such as
TCP/IP) similar to the one used in other private-preserving pro-
tocols, including onion routing [6]. In practice, communication
between nodes of the network is rst tunneled to the local gateway,
then from the gateway to the routing layer, from then to the destina-
tion gateway and nally to the destination node. Gateways do not
have an active role, and they only relay communication between
the nodes in their subnetwork and the routing layer transparently.
In general, each party in the communication will not reveal un-
necessary information to the following one. e gateway of the
sending node, in particular, will not communicate the ID of the
node to the routing layer. As the receiving gateway does not know
to which node in its subnetwork the communication is destined to,
it broadcasts the packets to all nodes in the receiving subnetwork.
Since communication is encrypted (as explained in the following),
only the intended receiver will be able to decrypt the information.
An example of network structure is presented in Figure 2.
3.2 Packets and routing information
Messages transmied through the network using the anonymous
routing protocol are composed of two parts: a header, which con-
tains routing information; and a payload, which is encrypted and
encapsulates the communication being anonymously routed (in
practice, the payload contain packets of lower layer protocols such
as UDP or TCP).
In order to encrypt the payload, we assume that each node in
the network has a public/private key pair, and a key distribution
mechanism exists between the nodes, so that each node knowing
another node’s ID either knows or can retrieve the node’s public
Table 1: Information available to each stakeholder. e rst
row identies cryptographic keys owned by the stakeholder
and information related to the lter; the second row routing
information and IDs of the nodes in the network.
Node j Routing Layer Network Mainteiner
EncPk# (b#) Sk# b#
Hash set Pk#, Sk# (homomorphic key pair)
Pkj , Skj Hash set
Node ID Public key Subnetwork IP Area Node IP Node ID Area Key pair
ID1 Pk1 122.200.64/24 1 IP1 ID1 1 Pk1, Sk1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IDi Pki 122.200.43/24 k IPi IDi k Pki , Ski
key as well. Encryption of the payload is performed by the sending
node s using the public key Pkr of the receiving node r , which
can then decrypt the transmission using its secret key Skr . As
communication is routed anonymously, the ID of the sender is
included in the encrypted payload as well, in order for the receiving
node to be able to respond.
e use of random IDs to identify the nodes removes the need to
know the destination IP address in order to initiate communication,
and hides the originating IP. It also means that no communication
is possible without knowledge of the ID of the destination node.
However, in order for the routing to be anonymous, the header
does not include the ID of the sending and receiving nodes, but only
routing information in the form of an homomorphically encrypted
SBF. In particular, the network maintainer builds an SBF represent-
ing all the nodes in the network and their respective subnetwork.
As shown in Figure 1, the elements of the set over which the SBF is
built are the IDs of the nodes, while the sets are the subnetworks,
each represented by a label. e SBF built this way, b#, is encrypted
using a homomorphic encryption scheme, as explained in Section
2.1. In this construction we use the Paillier cryptosystem [13], but
any cipher with equivalent homomorphic properties can be used.
In particular, other more lightweight cryptosystems could be more
suitable for resource-constrained devices. e secret key Sk# of the
homomorphic key pair is known by the routing layer, while the
public key Pk# and the encrypted lter EncPk#
(
b#
)
are distributed
to all the nodes. e nodes also know the set of hash functions used
in constructing the lter.
Table 1 summarizes the information that each party in the pro-
tocol needs in order to communicate. e information is divided in
two sets: information related to the encryption mechanism (such as
public keys), in the upper row; and information related to network
communication (including IDs and IP addresses), in the lower row.
In this paper, we assume that knowledge of the ID of a node equates
to knowledge of its public key: any suitable key distribution scheme
can be applied to achieve this.
3.3 Routing protocol
In the follwing, we describe the communication between a sender
node s and a receiver node r in two dierent subnetworks (∆s and
∆i respectively) over the anonymous routing protocol. is process
is visible in Figure 3.
Communication happens as follows:
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Node s Routing layer Node r
z
H (IDr )  EncPk# (b#) = e#
b#r
1
0
1
0
0
EncPkr (IDs |msд)
Payload
shuf f le (e#)
z
Header
count(i) = z?
DecSk# (e˜#) =
0
0
0
i
i
e˜#
z
Header
EncPkr (IDs |msд)
Payload To subnetwork i
IDs ,msд = DecSkr (EncPkr (IDs |msд))
EncPkr (IDs |msд)
Payload
Figure 3: Operation of the private routing protocol. Node s wants to securely transmit messagemsд to node r . Node r belongs
to subnetwork i, but s only knows r ’s ID (IDr ). Communication proceeds as follows: s generates the SBF related to IDr and
counts the number z of non-zero values in it; the lter is then multiplied (through an homomorphic encryption operation) by
the shared encrypted lter b#. e resulting lter is then sent to the routing layer, together with z. e routing layer decrypts
it, and computes the destination subnetwork i. e payload (that is, the encrypted message) is then routed to the subnetwork
i and node r , either through a gateway or by broadcast. r receives the message and decrypts it.
(1) e sender node s identies the anonymous identier IDr
of the receiving node r . s then builds an SBF with IDr as
only element, using the set of hash functions and counting
the number z of non-zero values in the resulting lter. en,
the node multiplies the lter it just built by the encrypted
lter EncPk#
(
b#
)
, using the multiplicative properties of the
cryptosystem. We call the resulting combined encrypted
lter e#. e sender shues e#, and sends it to the gateway,
with z and the encrypted payload EncPkr (msд).
(2) e sending gateway relays transparently the information
received by s to the routing layer.
(3) e routing layer decrypts e#: the decrypted lter is com-
posed of zeros, and a number of non-zero values i . If the
number of i’s is equal to z, then the receiving node r exists.
e value i identies the correct subnetwork to which the
communication will be routed. In case of diering values,
the smallest is used (see Section 2 for an explanation). Fi-
nally the routing layer transmits the encrypted payload
EncPkr (msд) to the correct subnetwork ∆i .
(4) e gateway of ∆i receives the encrypted payload and
brodcasts it to all the nodes in the subnetwork.
(5) e intended receiver r receives EncPkr (msд) and decrypts
it using its secret key Skr .
e properties of the Spatial Bloom Filters introduce the possibil-
ity of false positives, with two possible scenarios: rst, an element
outside the sets over which the lter has been built could be rec-
ognized as member of a set; second, an element that is a member
of a set X could be recognized as member of set Y . e former
case has no real implications for the proposed protocol: it would
only apply to the case of a node in the network using non-existing
or unknown IDs. But as no public key is associated to these IDs,
communication is impossible. e laer case could result in the
wrong routing being applied to the communication: however, we
note that the probability of this event can be calibrated through the
use of appropriate parameters (such as the length of the lter and
the number of hash functions) during the lter construction, and
a lter can be tested aer it has been built to verify that no false
positive (in the sense of wrong recognition) is possible.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyse the security of our construction, we discuss
three separate scenarios: in the rst, an aacker gains control
over a node in the network; in the second, the aacker controls
a subnetwork gateway, and in the third, the aacker controls the
routing layer (or part of it). In all three cases, we assume the aacker
will not actively disrupt network trac, but will limit himself to
observing trac visible to him in order to learn information on the
network structure and topology (context information). is is called
a semi-honest behaviour. In the following, we show how in each
of the three cases the aacker is unable to learn any meaningful
information on the network structure, and therefore the security
denition is satised. Security cannot be guaranteed in case the
aacker controls simultaneously 1) the routing layer and 2) either
one or more nodes, or one or more gateways, or a combination of
the two. e extent to which security is compromised in this case
depends on the number of nodes and gateways controlled, and is
limited to the parts of the network the aacker has visibility of.
Aacker controlling a node. In this case, the aacker can read
all information sent and received by the node, and learns the IDs
of all the other nodes with which the controlled node can com-
municate. e aacker also learns the encrypted lter, but has no
information to decrypt it. e aacker cannot learn the IP addresses
corresponding to the nodes, as they are unknown to the controlled
node and cannot be derived from the respective IDs. Similarly, the
aacker cannot learn the network structure (the position of the
nodes within the subnetworks and the number of subnetworks), as
the routing of sent and received packets is achieved anonymously.
Aacker controlling a subnetwork gateway. An aacker control-
ling a gateway will learn all the identity of all the nodes in the
respective subnetwork. However, he will not be able to read any
information sent and received by the nodes, as the payloads are
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encrypted. Similarly, he will not learn the destination of sent pack-
ets or the origin of received ones, as the routing information e# is
encrypted. Finally, the aacker cannot learn the network structure
as per the case above.
Aacker controlling the routing layer. In this case, the aacker
will be able to watch the ow of information between the dierent
subnetworks. However, due to the properties of the SBF, even
being able to decrypt the encrypted routing information e# will not
enable him to learn the identity of the receiving node r . Similarly, he
cannot learn the identity of the sending node s , as this is encrypted
within the payload, and the sending gateway will not communicate
it to him.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a private routing protocol that can be used
to communicate anonymously between dierent networks. Our
protocol can be applied in a variety of Internet of ings scenarios:
from Wireless Sensor Networks, to interconnected IoT systems
composed by dierent devices or infrastructures.
Our protocols achieves context privacy by using homomorphic
encryption, tunneling and the Spatial Bloom Filters. In particular,
we achieve the following properties: communication between nodes
can only be read by the intended receiver; the network structure
and topology (context information) is kept private to all nodes;
the identity and location of the sending and receiving nodes in
two dierent subnetworks is kept private to the routing layer;
and the routing layer is oblivious to the origin and destination
of any communication between subnetworks. ese properties
enable context privacy and security against adversaries who control
one or more nodes within the network, or even the routing layer.
erefore, the proposed anonymous routing protocol can prevent
aacks aimed at taking over control of the network.
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